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GOO HoLM v. SuPERIOR CouRT [42 C.2d 
"We hold that upon proof of the facts pleaded by plain-
tiffs the court could properly find that plaintiffs were the 
employers of the packing house labor; that not less than 80 
per cent of the packing house services were incidental to 
ordinary farming operations as distinguished from commercial 
operations, and hence were agricultural, and could properly 
conclude therefrom that all the wages paid were tax exempt.'' 
For the foregoing reasons I would reverse the judgment 
and permit the defendants to answer if they be so advised. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 7, 
1954. Carter, .J., and Schauer, .J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
[S. F. No. 18781. In Bank. Mar. 12, 1954.] 
DION R. HOLM, City Attorney, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. 
[1] 
[2] 
[3] 
[4] 
SUPEHIOR COUHT FOH THE CITY AND COUNTY 
OF SAN FHANCISCO, Respondent; WYNONA BELL, 
Real Party in Interest. 
Appeal- Orders Appealable: Discovery- Prohibition.-An 
order granting inspection of documents under Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1000, is not appealable, and prohibition is proper remedy to 
restrain its enforcement. 
Discovery-Bill of Discovery.-Formerly there was no right 
in equity to inspect an adversary's documentary evidence. 
!d.-Discovery Under Code.-While Code Civ. Proc., § 1000, 
relating to inspection of writings, is based on bill of discovery 
in chancery courts, the former equitable rule against inspection 
of documentary evidence does not establish a limitation on 
scope of code section. 
!d.-Discovery Under Code.-Where use of statutorv bill of 
discovery is denied by our courts it usually is be~ause in-
[3] See Cal.Jur., Discovery and Inspection, § 3; Am.Jur., Dis-
covery and Inspection, § 8 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 34; Discover}, 
§ 7; [2] Discovery,§ 1; [3-9, 17, 18] Discovery,§ 2; [10]. Witnesses, 
§ 74; [11, 13] Witnesses, § 76(2); [12] Witnesses, § 76(1); rJ4, 
19-21] Witnesses, § 76(3); [15, 16] Witnesses, § 77; [22] Wit-
nesses, § 7 4,. 
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formation sought to be obtained is not relevant or material 
to issues in case. 
[5] !d.-Discovery Under Code.-Documents sought to be inspected 
under statutory bill of discovery must be properly identified 
and admissible in evidence at ensuing trial. 
[6) !d.-Discovery Under Code.-The trend of judicial decisions 
is to relax rules which relate to. taking of evidence by ancillary 
proceeC!_ings, of which inspection of documents is one method, 
and provisions of Code Civ. Proc., § 1000, are remedial in 
nature and should be liberally construed. 
[7] !d.-Discovery Under Code.-Provision in Code Ci v. Proc., 
§ 1000, declaring that when an adversary refuses to comply 
with order of inspection the court "may exclude the entries of 
accounts of the book, or the document, or paper from being 
given in evidence," could apply only to documents in support 
of adversary's own case. 
[8] !d.-Discovery Under Code-Documents Subject to Inspection. 
-In action by bus passenger against city and bus driver for 
personal injuries, a document containing signed statement 
made by passenger to claims investigator of municipal railway 
concerning facts of accident, written reports by driver to city 
setting forth his version of accident, and photographs taken 
at scene of and following accident by agents of city are material 
and relevant to questions in issue, would be admissible in 
evidence, and are within scope of Code Civ. Proc., § 1000, 
subject to their confidential nature. 
[9) !d.-Discovery Under Code-Privileged Matters.-Where right 
to assert attorney-client privilege as set forth in Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1881, subd. 2, is clear, the statutory bill of discovery 
<'annot be used to defeat it. 
[10] Witnesses-Privileged Communications-Attorney and Client. 
--The objective of making a particular communication privi-
leged is to encourage a client to make complete disclosure to 
his attorney without fear that others may also be informed. 
[11] !d.-Privileged Communications-Attorney and Client.-The 
attorney-client privilege attaches where communication is made 
in confidence pursuant to a client-attorney relationship with 
respect to particular matter. 
[121 Id.- Privileged Communications- Attorney and Client.-
There is no attorney-client privilege in a communication which 
is not made to or for further communication to an attorney, 
although communication might have some connection with 
possible liability in future, such as reports submitted in regu-
lar course of business for study in accident prevention. 
[10] See Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 36 et seq.; Am.Jur., Witnesses, 
§ 460 et seq. 
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[13] !d.-Privileged Communications-Attorney and Client.-The 
attorney-client privilege does not attach to a communication 
not intended to be of a confidential nature. 
[14] !d.-Privileged Communications- Attorney and Client.-To 
make communication from client privileged the dominant pur-
pose must be for transmittal to attorney "in the course of 
professional employment." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. (2).) 
[15] !d.-Privileged Communications- Attorney and Client.-In 
any given situation it is necessary that a determination be 
made concerning facts asserted as basis for attorney-client 
privilege, and this determination is for trial court in first in-
stance. 
[16] !d.-Privileged Communications-Attorney and Client.-If it 
appears that communication from client is to serve a dual 
purpose, one for transmittal to attorney "in the course of pro-
fessional employment" and one not related to that purpose, 
the question presented to trial court is as to which purpose 
predominates, and question then is whether conclusion of trial 
court on facts is correct or has resulted in abuse of discretion. 
[17] Discovery-Discovery Under Code-Privileged Matters.-In 
action by bus passenger against city and bus driver for per-
sonal injuries, a document containing signed statement made 
by passenger to claims investigator of municipal railway con-
cerning facts of accident, and which was made in an "arm's 
length" conversation and transmitted to her adversaries' at-
torneys, is not a privileged communication between attorney 
and client, there being no attorney-client relationship, and 
document may therefore properly be reached under Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1000, relating to inspection of writings. 
[18] !d.-Discovery Under Code-Privileged Matters.-In action 
by bus passenger against city and bus driver for personal 
injuries, written reports by driver to city setting forth his 
version of accident and photographs taken at scene of and 
following accident by agents of city fall within attorney-client 
privilege, both having originated with agents of city and hav-
ing been forwarded to defendants' attorneys for use in possible 
litigation, and hence inspection of such documents by plaintiff 
should be denied on ground of such privilege. . 
[19] Witnesses-Privileged Communications-Attorney and Client. 
-Where a communication is between corporate employees and 
is embodied in reports or photographic evidence for purpose 
of redelivery to a corporate attorney, the attorney-client privi-
lege attaches if reports and photographs were created as a 
means of communicating confidential information to attorney. 
[20] Id.- Privileged Communications- Attorney and Client.-
There is no valid basis for distinction between a client's com-
munication for transmittal to attorney to prepare for threat-
Mar.1954] HoLM v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
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ened litigation following particular accident, and a communica-
tion prepared for identical purpose under standing rules in 
case of all accidents involving personal or property injury; 
the attorney-client privilege can attach in either instance in 
a proper case. 
[21] !d.-Privileged Communications- Attorney and Client.-In 
action by bus passenger against city and bus driver for personal 
injuries, it is of considerable importance to obtain all in-
formation available at scene of accident to safeguard rights 
of city, and in view of imminent possibility that city would be 
faced with a claim involving substantial liability for personal 
injuries far exceeding financial considerations in any other 
respect, it is unreasonable and unrealistic to say that com-
munication of documentary information to attorneys for use 
in their professional capacity was not foremost and pre-
dominantly in minds of those securing and transmitting such 
information. 
[22] !d.-Privileged Communications-Attorney and Client.-The 
attorney-client privilege is an important element in effective-
ness with which counselor-at-law is to advise his client and 
safeguard the latter's interests, and where right to privilege 
is clearly established it should not be cast aside; the fact that 
information contained in communications might also be used 
for incidental purposes not entitled to the privilege is un-
important. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of the City and County of San Francisco from enforc-
ing an order of inspection granted under Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1000. Writ granted in part and denied in part. 
Dion R. Holm, City Attorney (San Francisco) and Donald 
J. Kropp, Deputy City Attorney, for Petitioners. 
Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon and Roy Bronson as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
Shirley, Saroyan, Calvert & Barbagelata and J. Francis 
Shirley for Real Party in Interest. 
SHENK, J.-The petitioners seek a writ of prohibition to 
restrain the respondent court from enforcing its order for 
the inspection of certain documents in their possession. An 
alternative writ was issued. 
The order was made in an action in which Wynona Bell, 
referred to as the plaintiff, seeks to recover damages from the 
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petitioners Raymond Gnecco and the city and county of 
San Francisco for personal injuries alleged to have been 
suffered by her due to the alleged negligent operation by 
Gnecco, an employee of the city's municipal railway, of a bus 
on which she was a passenger. The petitioners Dion H. 
Holm and Donald ,J. Kropp are attorneys at law who at all 
times involved represented the city and county. They are also 
the lega~ representatives of Gnecco as an employee of the city 
and county in the action for damages. Before trial in that 
action the plaintiff moved under section 1000 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure for an order permitting her to inspect, among 
other things, (1) a document containing a signed statement 
made by her to a claims investigator of the municipal rail-
way concerning the facts of the accident; (2), written reports 
by Gnecco to the city setting forth his version of the accident, 
and (3) photographs taken at the scene of and following the 
accident by agents of the city. 
'l'he pertinent parts of section 1000 provide : ''Any cot1rt 
in which an action is pending, or a judge or justice thereof 
may, upon notice, order either party to give to the other, 
within a specified time, an inspection and copy or permission 
to take a copy, of entries of accounts in any book, or of any 
document or paper in his possession, or under his control, 
·containing evidence relating to the merits of the action, or 
the defense therein . . . " 
In support of the motion for the order of inspection it was 
stated in affidavits on behalf of the plaintiff that she had 
signed a written statement setting forth factual information 
material to the controversy, the contents of which she could 
not remember and a copy of which had not been furnished 
her. It was stated in an af-fidavit of the plaintiff's counsel 
that the documents involved were recorded and preserved 
in the "regular course of business of defendants in the oper-
ation of the Municipal Railway." It is claimed that a 
deposition of the petitioner Gnecco, not made a part of the 
record here, also contains evidence that the reports were filed 
in the regular course of business. There is no further refer-
ence to the purpose of the documents in the complaint. the 
notice of motion, other supporting af-fidavits or in any other 
documents which are a part of the plaintiff's record. The 
deputy city attorney and the general claims agent for the 
Municipal Hailway, in af-fidavits filed on behalf of the peti-
tioners, stated that the questioned documents had been kept 
in confidence in the possession or control of one of them sl.nce 
Mar.~1954] HoL:M: v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
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they were made; that they were in the possession of the 
attorney at the time of the demand for their production; 
that they were secured and kept in confidence for use by 
the attorneys for information and aid in defending in any 
litigation arising out of the accident, and that the documents 
are protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
The foregoing was the only evidence before the court. 
The motion was granted as to the documents involved, and 
the court ordered the petitioners to produce them. There-
after a motion to vacate the order was denied. The peti-
tioners refused to comply with the order asserting that the 
court lacked jurisdiction to make it. The court threatens 
to enforce its order by contempt proceedings and the peti-
tioners seek to restrain its enforcement by this application 
for the writ of prohibition. 
[1] The order is not appealable and prohibition is the 
proper remedy. (City&:: County of San Francisco v. Superior 
Court, 38 Cal.2d 156 [238 P.2d 581] ; Franchise Tax Board 
v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.2d 538 [225 P.2d 905].) 
The petitioners' main contentions are that the attorney-
client privilege (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. (2)) bars in-
spection of the papers; that section 1000 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure is no broader than the historical bill of discovery in 
equity, and that by reason of the limitations of the latter, the 
documents may not be inspected. 
[2] In regard to the latter contention it is true that 
there formerly was no right in equity to inspect an adversary's 
documentary evidence. (6 Wigmore, Evidence, 3d ed., 1940, 
§ 1857, p. 443.) [3] However, while the cases hold that 
section 1000 is based upon the bill of discovery in chancery 
courts (Union Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.2d 449 
[81 P.2d 150, 118 A.L.R. 259]; Wright v. Superior Court, 
139 Cal. 469 [73 P. 145] ), they do not hold that the equitable 
rule establishes a limitation on the scope of our code section. 
[4] Where the use of the statutory bill of discovery is denied 
by our courts it usually is because the information sought 
to be obtained is not relevant or material to any of the issues 
in the case. (Union Collection Co. v. Snperior Court, 149 
Cal. 790 [87 P. 1035] ; Ex parte Clarke, 126 Cal. 235 [58 
P. 546, 77 Am.St.Rep. 176, 46 hRA. 835] .) [5] ft has 
been said that the documents also must be properly idrntified 
and admissible in evidence at the ensuing trial. (McClatchy 
Newspapers v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.2d 386 [159 P.2d 944].) 
But none of the cases hold that section 1000 is to be construed 
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as narrowly as the petitioners contend. [6] On the con-
trary, in Union Trust Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.2d 
449, this court stated at page 462: "That the trend of judicial 
decisions is to relax the rules which relate to the taking of 
evidence by ancillary proceedings of which the inspection 
of documents is one method. . . . " It further quoted from 
Corpus Juris, volume 18, page 116, to the effect that provi-
sions such as section 1000 are '' remediill in their nature and 
should be liberally construed." (See also Austin v. Tur-
rentine, 30 Cal.App.2d 750 [87 P.2d 72, 88 P.2d 178] .) 
[7] Section 1000 provides in part that when an adversary 
refuses to comply with an order of inspection, the court "may 
exclude the entries of accounts of the book, or the document, 
or paper from being given in evidence. . .. " It is apparent 
that this could apply only to documents in support of the 
adversary's own case. It has been said, without discussion 
of the point here involved, that inspection was proper in 
a case where account books bore evidence of the adversary's 
own case. (Avery v. Wiltsee, 177 Cal. 484, 488 [171 P. 95] ; 
see also Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 749 
[235 P.2d 833]; Demaree v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.2d 99 
[73 P.2d 605].) 
[8] There is no question but that the documents here 
sought to be inspected are material and relevant to questions 
in issue, would be admissible in evidence, and are within 
the scope of section 1000 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
subject to their confidential nature. 
The right to maintain the security of a confidential com-
munication under the attorney-client privilege is set forth 
in section 1881 of the Code of Civil Procedure which states 
in part: ''There are particular relations in which it is the 
policy of the law to encourage confidence. and to preserve 
it inviolate; therefore, a person can not be examined as a 
witness in the following cases . . . 2. Attorney and Client. 
An attorney can not, without the consent of his client, be 
examined as to any communication made by the client to 
him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional 
employment .... " (See also Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. 
(e).) [9] Where the right to assert the privilege is clear it 
should follow that the bill of discovery cannot be used to de-
feat it. 
[10] The objective of making a particular communication 
privileged is to encourage a client to make a complete dis-
Mar.1954) HoLM v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
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closure to his attorney without fear that others may also be 
informed. (City & County of San Francisco v. Superior 
Court, 37 Cal.2d 227, 235 [231 P.2d 26, 25 A.L.R.2d 1418] ; 
8 Wigmore, Evidence, supra, § 2380a, p. 813.) [11] The 
privilege attaches where the communication is made in con-
fidence pursuant to a client-attorney relationship with respect 
to the particular matter. (McKnew v. Superior Court, 23 
Cal.2d 58, 65-66 [142 P.2d 1].) [12] Thus there would 
seem to be no privilege in a communication which is not made 
to or for further communication to an attorney, although the 
communication might have some connection with possible 
liability in the future, such as reports submitted in the regular 
course of business for study in accident prevention. [13] Nor 
does the privilege attach to a communication not intended to 
be of a confidential nature. (City & County of San Fran-
cisco v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.2d 227, 234-235; Me-
Knew v. Superior Court, supra, 23 Cal.2d 58, 66.) [14] To 
make the communication privileged the dominant purpose 
must be for transmittal to an attorney ''in the course of pro-
fessional employment." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. (2) ; 
City &; County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, supra, 
37 Cal.2d 227, 235.) 
[15] In any given situation it is necessary that a deter-
mination be made concerning the facts asserted as a basis 
for the privilege. This determination is for the trial court 
in the first instance. Where it is clear that the communication 
has but a single purpose, there is little difficulty in concludii\g 
that the privilege should be applied or withheld accordingly. 
[16] If it appears that the communication is to serve a 
dual purpose, one for transmittal to an attorney ''in the course 
of professional employment" and one not related to that 
purpose, the question presented to the trial court is as to 
which purpose predominates. The question then is whether 
the conclusion of the trial court on the facts is correct or 
has resulted in an abuse of discretion. 
[17] In the present case the plaintiff's statement to the 
city's claims investigator was recorded as she made it. After 
being transcribed she signed her name to the document. Her 
assertions that she was not given a copy of the statement 
and that she does not remember what she said are not dis-
puted. She does not seek to have disclosed any communica-
tion from her adversaries to their attorneys. She merely 
seeks the record of a communication which she herself made 
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in an '' <lrm 's length'' conversation and which was transmitted 
to her adversarie,;' attorneys. Clearly as to the document 
em bodying this communication there is no attorney-client 
relationship, the commtmication was not made nor intended 
to be iu eonfictrnce, and the privilege. did not attach. Accord-
ingly the documf'nt (·l1n properly he reaehed nnder the statu-
1 ory provisions. 
[18] As to the reports and photographs it is clear that 
from their character and content they fall within the privilege. 
Both originated with agents of the city and it is undisputed 
that they were forwarded in confidence to the defendants' 
attorneys for use in possible litigation. It is stated in City 
& County of San F'ranc·isco v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal. 
2d 227 at page 235: ''The privilege embraces not only oral 
or written statements but actions, signs, or other means of 
communicating information by a client to his attorney.'' 
And at page 236-237: "It is no less the client's communica-
tion to the attorney when it is given by the client to an agent 
for transmission to the attorney, and it is immaterial whether 
the agent is the agent of the attorney, the client, or both. 
'[T]he client's freedom of communication requires a liberty 
of employing other means than his own personal action. The 
privilege of confidence would be a vain one unless its exer-
eise could be thus delegated. A communication, then, by any 
form of agency employed or set in motion by the client is 
within the privilege . . . ( 8 Wigmore, supra, § 2317, pp. 
616-617 .... ) " [19] It follows that where the communi-
cation is between corporate employees and is embodied in 
reports or photographic evidence for the purpose of redelivery 
to a corporate attorney the privilege attaches if the reports 
and photographs were ereated as a means of communicating 
confidential information to the attorney. 
The present proceeding calls for the determination of the 
dominant purpose for which the reports and photographs 
·were created. As previously stated, the affidavits of the peti-
tioners in the trial court revealed that the documents were 
prepared as confidential communications to the city attorney 
in threat of litigation and that the documents had at all times 
been treated as such. These affidavits were uncontradicted 
as to the purpose of the documents. In this connection the 
plaintiff asserts only that they were prepared in the regular 
eourse of business. [20] But there is no valid basis for a 
distinction between a communication created for transmittal 
to an attorney to prepare for threatened litigation following 
Mar.1954] HOLJII[ v. SUPERIOR COURT 
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particular accidents, and a communication prepared for an 
identical purpose under standing rules in the case of all 
accidents involving personal or property injury. Because 
the scope of the operations of the defendant city's municipal 
railway is such as to require communications of this nature 
as a routine matter, it cannot be said that the attorney-client 
priVilege did not attach. 
[21] In any action for damages such as the pending one 
it is of considerable importance to obtain all information 
available at the scene of the accident in order to safeguard 
the rights of the party likely to be charged with negligence. 
It is because of this fact that diligence is required in behalf 
of such party to avoid or prepare for litigation·. In view of 
the imminent possibility that the city would be faced with 
a claim involving substantial liability for personal injuries 
far exceeding financial considerations in any other respect, 
it is unreasonable and unrealistic to say that the communica-
tion of the documentary information to the attorneys for use 
in their professional capacity was not foremost and predomi-
nately in the minds of those securing and transmitting the 
same. 
The court did not make specific findings of fact upon 
which its order for the production of the documents was 
based. However, in view of the undisputed evidence both 
as to the intended purpose and the actual practice followed 
any determination which would not accord greater importance 
to the purpose of communications to the attorneys in their 
professional capacities than to any other purpose would be 
an abuse of discretion. [22] The attorney-client privilege 
is an important element in the effectiveness with which the 
counselor-at-law is to advise his client and safeguard the 
latter's interests. Where, as here, the right to the privilege 
is clearly established it should not be cast aside. The fact 
that the information contained in the communications might 
also be used for incidental purposes not entitled to the privilege 
is unimportant. 
The question of the application of section 1000 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure as affecting the attorney-client privi-
lege appears not to have been decided by any California court. 
However, in an analogous situation in New York Cas. Co. v. 
S1tper1:or Co1trt, 30 Cal.App.2d 130 [85 P.2d 965], it was 
sought to perpetuate evidence under sections 2083-2086 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. The court held that confidential 
reports of an accident procured for the use of an insurance 
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company's attorney were protected by the attorney-client 
privilege. Section 1000 was not referred to but the court cited 
with approval two Ohio decisions that dealt with discovery 
procedures. (In re Klemann, 132 Ohio St. 187 [5 N.E.2d 
492, 108 A.L.;R. 505] ; Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1 [77 
N.E. 276, 6 L.R.A.N.S. 325] .) Those cases dealt with an 
effort to obtain by subpoena duces tecttm reports of an acci-
dent prepared by an insured for its immrer and insurer's 
attorneys. The Ohio court held the communications to the 
insurer to be privileged. 
Numerous decisions in other states have held that where 
confidential reports were submitted by agents of a corporation 
for transmittal to the corporate attorney, the privilege at-
tached as against proceedings for discovery. (See cases 
compiled in 146 A.L.R. at 988.) In many of the cases it 
was emphasized that the crucial question is the purpose for 
which the communication originated. In Cully v. Northern P. 
R. Co., 35 Wash. 241 [77 P. 202], the court held that routine 
correspondence, reports and documents relating to the acci-
dental injury of the plaintiff were privileged, the court stat-
ing:' 'We can conceive of no reason why a different rule should 
apply in this case than prevails in the case of privileged 
commup.ications generally.'' 
It is concluded that the confidential communications em-
bodied in the reports and photographs are protected by the 
attorney-client privilege. As to those documents the peremp-
tory writ is granted; as to the document containing the signed 
statement of the plaintiff to the defendant's investigator, the 
writ is denied. The alternative writ is discharged. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-The primary 
object of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage the 
client to make a full disclosure of all the facts to his attorney. 
To achieve this object it is proper that the client should be 
allowed to employ whatever means of communication are 
necessary accurately to inform his attorney of the facts. (City 
& County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 
227, 235-237 [231 P.2d 26, 25 A.L.R.2d 1418], and cases and 
authorities cited.) Accordingly, the privilege is not lost if 
the client casts his communication in the form of reports 
compiled by him or his agents for that purpose. Moreover, 
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in this respect there is no logical difference between an oral 
or written report of what the client or his agent saw and a 
photograph taken for the purpose of communicating the 
scene to the attorney. On the other hand, a document, report, 
or photograph that would otherwise be admissible in evidence 
does not become privileged merely because the client delivers 
it to his attorney. Unless a report or photograph is created 
for the purpose of communicating information to the attorney, 
it cannot have the character of a privileged communication 
when it comes into existence and accordingly cannot become 
privileged if it is later delivered to the attorney. (See 8 Wig-
more on Evidence [3d ed.], § 2307, p. 594.) 
No problem is presented if it is clear that the only purpose 
of preparing a report is to communicate it to the attorney. 
In many situations, however, reports will be made for other 
purposes as well. The question arises, therefore, whether the 
existence of purposes for preparing reports in addition to 
that of communicating with the attorney will defeat the 
privilege. This question may only be answered by evaluating 
the relative importance of the purposes present in the light 
of the object of the privilege, bearing in mind that it ''is 
strictly construed, since it suppresses relevant facts that may 
be necessary for a just decision." (City & County of San 
Francisco v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.2d 227, 234.) 
If the purposes other than that of communicating facts 
to the attorney are so minor that the client would not create 
reports if no communication were contemplated, the existence 
of such purposes should not defeat the privilege. In such 
cases to encourage full disclosure it is necessary to encourage 
the creation of the reports, and accordingly, the object of 
the privilege is served by making them privileged. If, on 
the other hand, reasons unrelated to the seeking of legal 
advice or service would cause the client to create reports, 
they should not be privileged. In such cases the reports 
would be created in any event, and accordingly, whether or 
not they were privileged would not affect their being created. 
It follows, therefore, that in any case where reports are made, 
not only for the purpose of communicating to the attorney, 
but for other purposes as well, the object of the privilege is 
subserved only by making those reports privileged that would 
not be created but for the purpose of communication. 
In the present case it is true that one reason the municipal 
railway secures accident reports from its employees and takes 
photographs is to communicate facts to its attorney. The 
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controlling question, however, is whether it would secure the 
reports and take the photographs in any event. The munici-
pal railway is in the business of transportation and is re-
quired to exereise "the utmost care and diligence" toward 
its customers. ( Civ. Code, § 2100.) It is under a duty to 
employ careful drivers and acquire and maintain safe equip-
ment. When an aecident oecurs it must make an investiga-
tion of the facts, not only for the purposes of litigation that 
may arise therefrom, but also to enable it to eliminate careless 
drivers, maintenanee men, and dangerous and defective equip-
ment. It would be subject to a charge of continuing negli-
gence in the operation of its system if it did not do so. Under 
these eircumstances the trial court was justified in concluding 
that the accident reports and photographs would be made 
regardless of the purpose of eommunicating facts to the rail-
way's attorney, and aecordingly, they should not be privi-
leged. 
I concur in the conclusion of Mr. Justice Shenk that plain-
tiff's statement was not privileged. 
I would deny the writ in its entirety. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The decision of the majority in this case is another step 
backward in the administration of justice-the denial of the 
power of a trial judge to force the adverse party to produce 
competent, material evidence germane to the issues in the 
ease notwithstanding a showing that the evidence had been 
prepared in the ordinary course of defendant's business and 
was then available. 
There ean be no doubt that upon the faets stated in the 
affidavits before the superior court it could conclude either 
that the papers sought to be inspected were prepared for 
the purpose of litigation and transmittal to the attorney for 
Gnecco and the city, and hence privileged, or that they were 
not; that they were prepared in the regular course of busi-
ness of efTiciently operating the transportation system and 
hence not privileged. It chose to believe those supporting 
the latter view. I agree that the papers were properly in-
spectable under section 1000 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
but that they could have been privileged if they were pre-
pared for the purpose of transmittal to the attorney in con-
nection with pending or threatened litigation. 
As stated by the District Court of Appeal when this case 
was decided by that court by unanimous decision ( Cal.App.) 
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251 P .2rl 35, 36-37; "While a party is to be protected 
from unnecessary disclosure to others of the contents of his 
private books, papers and records, as is said in McKinley v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 80 Cal.App.2d 301, 315 [181 P.2d 899], 
'no party has a right to refuse to produce any report or 
document which may have a bearing upon the facts of the 
pending litigation.' 
"Nor can it be said that any of the documents are privileged 
as petitioner contends. 'l'he photographs have simply re-
corded what any eyewitness could have seen. The statement 
of facts by the plaintiff was made to the defendant's agent. 
Certainly, the relationship of client and attorney did not exist 
between Wynona Bell and the city attorney. They were 
dealing at arm's length. Although the report of Gnecco, the 
driver, originated with him, it does not appear to have been 
directed to any attorney. In fact the record does not disclose 
that Gnecco had any attorney at the time the report was 
made up. The report appears to be more of a statement of 
facts for study in the prevention of accidents than a commu-
nication from a client to his attorney. As is stated in Wig-
more on Evidence, section 2318, second edition, it is only 
those documents which the pa:rty has created as a communi-
cating client, that are privileged. 
"In Construction Prod. Corp. v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. 
App.2d 403, 404 [229 P.2d 399], it is said that 'In determin-
ing the propriety of an order under section 1000, Code of 
Civil Procedure, it must be borne in mind that the trial 
court's action thereunder is discretionary and .that all intend-
ments are in favor of the validity of such order. Accordingly, 
such action will not be annulled unless a clear abuse of that 
discretion appears. (Milton Kauffman, Inc. v. Su.perior 
Court, 94 Cal.App.2d 8, 16 [210 P.2d 88] .) ' The order here 
made does not appear to violate any fundamental right of 
the petitioner.'' 
There was a clear conflict in the affidavits on the question 
of the purpose for which the papers were prepared. This is 
apparent on their face. The affidavits of the claimants of 
the privilege (the city and Gnecco) stated that the pa"Qers 
were for transmittal to their attorney for use in the pending 
litigation. On the other hand, plaintiff's affidavits opposing 
the privilege stated that they were made in the regular course 
of business of the city in operating its transportation system 
and are known as "defect cards" and "defect reports," that 
42 C.2d-17 
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is, reports of unusual conditions or defects with respect to 
the busses. The trial court resolved this conflict against the 
existence of a factual basis for the privilege and this court 
should not, as does the majority, reweigh the affidavits and 
arrive at a contrary conclusion. 
It is a settled rule that the one claiming the privilege has 
the burden of establishing the facts as a basis for its appli-
cation (McKnew v. St~perior Court, 23 Cal.2d 58 [142 P.2d 1]; 
Carroll v. Sprague, 59 Cal. 655; Sharon v. Sharon, 79 Cal. 633 
[22 P. 26, 131]; Collette v. Sarrasin, 184 Cal. 283 [193 P. 
571]). Whether the privilege is properly available, is a 
fachtal issue to be disposed of according to the principles 
applicable to such questions. As said in Hager v. Shindler, 
29 Cal. 47, 64: " ... whether a communication by a client 
to his attorney was made in confidence, is a question of fact, 
to be disposed of on principles applicable universally to ques-
tions of that character. 
"We must assume that the Court below passed upon the 
point as involving a matter of fact, and found that Mastick 's 
knowledge of the voluntary character of the deed was not 
confidential; and we consider the finding to be well sustained 
by the evidence.'' In Stewart v. Dottglass, 9 Cal.App. 712, 
714 [100 P. 711], it is said: "The first assignment of error 
argued by plaintiff relates to the ruling of the court admit-
ting evidence of certain statements made by him to an attor-
ney at law over the objection that they were privileged. 
When this objection was made, and before passing upon it, 
the court took the testimony of witnesses to determine whether 
or not these statements were made in the course of profes-
sional employment. This was the proper procedure. The 
court found that the statements were not so made. It being 
within the province of the trial court to pass upon this, like 
any other question of fact, and the evidence being conflicting, 
the conclttsion of the trial court wiU stand as final." (Em-
phasis added.) In Dwelly v. McReynolds, 6 Cal.2d 128 [56 
P.2d 1232], this court said at page 131: "The question of 
privilege was a matter for the trial court's determination 
and its decision, upon conflicting evidence, is conclusive.'' 
Those principles are in accord with the general rule that 
where there is a conflict in affidavits on a factual issue before 
the trial court that court's resolution thereof is binding on 
an appellate court. (Voeltz v. Bakery etc. Union, 40 Cal.2d 
382 [254 P.2d 553] ; Hale v. Bohannon, 38 Cal.2d 458 [241 
P.2d 4]; Lohman v. Lohman, 29 Cal.2d 144 [173 P.2d 657]; 
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Gordon v. Perkins, 203 Cal. 183 [263 P. 231]; Doak v. Bruson, 
152 Cal. 17 [91 P. 1001]; Brainard v. Brainard, 82 Cal.App. 
2d 478 [186 P.2d 990] .) 
In the face of these well-established principles the majority 
holds that while regular course of business was one of the 
purposes, the dominant or primary purpose was that the 
papers were prepared and transmitted to the attorney to be 
used in litigation. In this connection the majority opinion 
states : ''As to the reports and photographs it is clear that 
from their character and content they fall within the privi-
lege. Both originated with agents of the city and it is undis-
puted that they were forwarded in confidence to the defend-
ants' attorneys for use in possible litigation." This holding 
disregards the settled rule that the burden of establishing the 
right to the privilege rests upon the claimants and it is 
the function of the trial court to determine what the dominant 
purpose was. The trial court could have rejected the claim-
ants' conclusionary statements in their affidavits that the 
papers were for transmittal to the attorneys for the purpose 
of litigation. In reaching its result the majority states: 
"These affidavits were uncontradicted as to the purpose of 
the documents. In this connection the plaintiff asserts only 
th&t they were prepared in the regular course of business. 
But there is no valid basis for a distinction between a com-
munication created for transmittal to an attorney to prepare 
for threatened litigation following particular accidents, and 
a communication prepared for an identical purpose under 
standing rules in the case of all accidents involving personal 
or property injury. Because the scope of the operations of 
the defendant city's Municipal Railway is such as to require 
communications of this nature as a routine matter, it cannot 
be said that the attorney-client privilege did not attach." 
The claimant's affidavits were contradicted because it appears 
from plaintiff's affidavits that Gnecco 's statement and the 
photographs were prepared as a defect report in the regular 
course of business and not for use in litigation, and, therefore, 
not within the privilege. If it was "routine" and usual 
business to have such papers, the fact that they might be 
used in connection with litigation would not make them privi-
leged. The majority holding ignores the probability that 
the papers were for the purpose of more efficiently operating 
the transportation system-to check on the skill of the drivers 
and condition of the equipment in order that appropriate 
steps could be taken to cure any deficiencies. The trial court 
516 HoLM v. SuPERIOR CouRT [42 C.2d 
could, as it did, choose that purpose as the dominant one 
believing that the possibility of litigation was merely inci-
dental and whieh might not even mature into an existing 
fact. In holding to the contrary the majority again usurps 
the function of the trial court by determining an issue of 
fact on conflicting evidence. The majority does this by 
arbitrarily disregarding the conflicting statements in the 
affidavits of the respective parties and holding that the trial 
court abused it~ diseretion in determining what the dominant 
purpose was for the preparation of Gnecco 's report of the 
accident and the taking of photographs. The majority hold-
ing in this respect is in line with the current trend of recent 
decisions of this court to determine the facts contrary to 
the trial court even though there is a substantial conflict in 
the evidence.1 By its holding, as a matter of law, that reports, 
even though made as a routine business matter, are never-
theless privileged if later transmitted to an attorney for 
threatened litigation, the majority adopts a rule clearly out 
of line with the great weight of authority elsewhere. It is 
stated with ample and correct citation of authority ''. . . the 
great weight of authority favors the view that such a state-
ment or report made in the ordinary course of duty and before 
litigation has been commenced or threatened is not a privi-
leged communication.'' (Emphasis added; 146 A.L.R. 977, 
980.) 
It has been held repeatedly that section 1000 should be 
liberally construed in favor of inspection (see Union Tmst 
Go. v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.2d 449 [81 P.2d 150, 118 A.hR. 
259] ; A1tstin v. Tttrrentine, 30 Cal.App.2d 750 [87 P.2d 72, 
88 P.2d 178]; Milton J[auffrnan, Inc. v. Superior Court, 94 
1 Lei pert v. Honolcl, 39 Cal.2d 462 [247 P.2d 324, 29 A.L.R.2d 1] 85]; 
Rose v. Melocly Lane, 39 Cal.2d 481 [247 P.2d 335]; Cary v. Wentzel, 
:l9 Cal.2d 491 [247 P.2d 341]; Hamasaki v. Flotho, 39 Cal.2d 602 [248 
P.2d 910]; Roclabau.gh v. Teku.s, 39 Cal.2d 290 [246 P.2d 633]; Hawaiian 
Pineapple Co. v. Inclu.strial Ace. Com., 40 Cal.2d 656 [255 P.2d 431]; 
Bette1· Foocl Mkts. v. American Dist. Teleg. Co., 40 Cal.2d 179 [253 P.2d 
J 0]; Atkinson v. Pacific Hire Extinguisher Co., 40 Cal.2d 192 [263 
P.2d 18]; S1ttter B1ttte Canal Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 40 Cal.2d 139 
[2.'i1 P.2d 97n]; kfercer-Frasrr Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com .. 40 Cal.2d. 
102 [251 P.2d 9G5]; G'ill v. Hearst P11blishing Co., 40 Cal.2d 224 [253 
P.2d 441]; Goodman v. Harris, 40 Cal.2d 2G4 [253 P.2d 4471; Pirkle 
v. Oakdale Union etc. School Dist., 40 Cal.2d 207 [2G3 P.2d 1]; Bm·tis 
v. Universal Pict?tres Co., Inc., 40 Cal.2d 823 [2Fi6 P.2d 933]; K1trlan 
v. Colmnbia Broadcasting Systern, 40 Cal.2d 79!) [2G6 .P.2d 9621; Weitzen-
korn v. Lesser, 40 Cnl.2d 778 [2fi6 P.2d 947]; T~tmer v. Mellon, 41 Cal. 
2d 4i5 r2!i7 P.2d 1G]; Barrett v. City of Clarenwnt, 41 Cal.2d 70 [256 
P.2d 977]; Estate of IAngenfelter, 38 Cal.2d 571 [241 P.2d 990]; Gray 
v. Brin7cerhoff, 41 Cal.2d 180 [258 P.2d 834]. 
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Cal.App.2d 8 [210 P.2d 88) ; Parker v. Shell Oil Co., 55 Cal. 
App.2d 48 [130 P.2d 158]; McClatchy Newspapers v. SttpM·ior 
C01trt, 26 Cal.2d 386 [159 P.2d 944]), the same as the statutes 
relating to depositions, including that of the adverse party 
and his agents (Code Civ. Proc., § 2055). (Pollak v. Superior 
Court, 197 Cal. 389 [240 P. 1006] ; Moran v. Superior Court, 
38 Cal..App.2d 328 [100 P.2d 1096] ; Zellerbach v. S1tperior 
Court, 3 Cal.App.2d 49 [39 P.2d 252] .) As stated in Un·ion 
Trust Co. v. Sttperior Court, supra, 11 Cal.2d 449, 462: 
''. . . the enactment of statutes relative to the remedy of 
obtaining evidence by inspection was had with a view to 
provide a more speedy and less expensive remedy than by 
the proceedings in chancery; that they 'are remedial in their 
nature and should be liberally construed.' 
''That the trend of .fu.dicial decisions is to relax the rules 
which relate to the taking of evidence by ancillary pro-
ceedings, of which the inspection of documents is one method, 
to the end that the trial of actions may be expedited and 
justice be more efficaciously and speedily administered, is 
reflected in many modern decisions, some of which are here 
noted.'' (!ilmphasis added.) 
It has been held thereunder (Code Civ. Proc., § 1000) that 
the papers sought to be inspected must be material and 
admissible in evidence at the ensuing trial of the action, and 
they must be properly identified; the applicant for the order 
of inspection must show those things to justify an order. 
(McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Oal.2d 
386; Milton Kauffman, Inc. v. S1tperior Court, supra, 94 Cal. 
App.2d 8; Kullman, SaTz & Co. v. Superior Cmtrt, 15 CaLApp. 
276 [114 P. 589]. But" Section 1000 is remedial in character 
and is to he liberally construed. The modern tendency in 
the administration of justice is to relax the rules which 
relate to the inspection of writings to the end that the trial 
of actions may be expedited and justice be more efficaciously 
and speedily administered. The statute was designed to 
assist a party to an action to discover material facts even 
though the writings evidencing such' facts are in the posses-
sion of the adverse party. It is a wholesome aid to the 
proper administration of justice. The obtaining of inspec-
tion of writings in a case where it appears that the rights 
of a party may depend upon its proper exercise, should not 
be regarded • as a game' having fixed rules 'that must be 
literally and punctiliously observed.' Refusal to comply with 
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an order of inspection based on technical objections does 
violence to the spirit and intent of the statute." (MiUon 
Kauffman, Inc. v. Sttperior Court, supra, 94 Cal.App.2d 8, 
15; emphasis added.) Those elements may be shown by the 
pleadings in the action as well as affidavits offered by the 
applicant for the order. (See Union Trust Co. v. Superior 
Court s~~pra, 11 Cal.2d 449; M·ilton Kauffman, Inc. v. Su-
perior Court, supra, 94 Cal.App.2d 8.) 
As above mentioned the complaint in plaintiff's action 
charged that the negligent operation of the bus by Gnecco, the 
city's driver, caused her injuries. The city and Gnecco 
answered denying the material allegations and pleaded con-
tributory negligence on the part of plaintiff. The affidavits 
show that Gnecco made a written report to city officials of 
the accident, the basis of the action, as shown by his deposi-
tion which was taken; that the photographs of the bus and 
plaintiff were taken by the city shortly after the accident; 
that 11 days after the accident an agent of the city questioned 
plaintiff regarding the events that transpired at the accident; 
and her statements were written by the agent and she signed 
this statement; that she does not remember what she said 
because of her emotional and physical condition at the time 
the statement was taken. While there are conclusionary 
statements in the affidavits with reference to the materiality 
of these papers, their relevancy is sufficiently shown. The 
report of Gnecco of the accident would necessarily include 
his version of the facts concerning it, the precise matters 
in issue in the action. It may well be admissible, if it con-
tains admissions against him, to prove negligence, or even 
for the same purpose against the city if within the scope of 
his employment. Also, it may be admissible to impeach his 
testimony at the trial if there is a variance. Plainly the 
photographs of the bus and the scene of the accident are 
relevant and commonly used. (See 10 Cal.Jur. 860, 896; 
Code Civ. Proc., § 1954.) Plaintiff's statement could be used 
to refresh her memory or to impeach her if there is a variance 
between it and her testimony at the trial. 
It is urged, however, that under the equity bill of dis-
covery rules, an inspection before trial cannot be had by a 
party (plaintiff here) to ascertain the documentary evidence 
which his opponent (petitioners here) has to support his own 
case. The general rule at common law was that a party was 
not entitled to ascertain before trial the tenor of his adver-
sary's evidence. (Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.), § 1845.) 
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In equity and by a bill of discovery in equity for assistance 
in the law court, there was an exception authorizing the 
inspection before trial of documents in the adversary's pos-
session (ibid., §§ 1846, 1857). The limitation on that right 
of inspection "was that it should include only those docu-
ments which contained the evidence of the applicant, and not 
those which contained the adversary's own evidence. If, for 
example, A. sued B to enforce a contract, and the instrument 
was in B 's possession, A. could obtain inspection of that 
instrument, but not of a release which B might also possess. 
It is true that A. might sometimes be unaware of the precise 
contents or even of the existence of documents evidencing his 
own case but possessed by B, and to this extent the discovery 
and inspection would relieve him from the risk of unfair 
surprise and would thus in spirit be an exception to the 
general rule and a decided improvement over his situation 
under common-law procedure. But this would be merely an 
accidental result in a given case ; in theory of law he was 
inspecting merely that which was in a sense already his own. 
The strict and invariable rule, already briefly noted (ante, 
§ 1846), in harmony with the rule already examined for 
witnesses (ante, § 1856b), was that no inspection in advance 
could be demanded of those documents which were to serve 
merely as the adversary's own evidence. 
''In short, there was in chancery no exception to the broad 
principle of the common law that a party is not entitled to 
ascertain before trial the tenor of the documentary evidence 
which the adversary possesses to support his own case." 
(Ibid., § 1857.) 
To simplify the matter, most states adopted statutes author-
izing law courts to order pretrial inspection of documents. 
(Ibid., § 1859.) This state has had such a statute since its 
inception (California Practice Act, Stats. 1851, p. 51, § 446). 
It was placed in the original Code of Civil Procedure as sec-
tion 1000 (as it is now) and has at all times read substan-
tially the same. Particular provision is made with respect 
to inspection of accounts (Code Civ. Proc., § 454), written 
instruments in actions on them (Code Civ. Proc., § 449), 
notice to produce a writing (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1938-1939) 
and using the subpoena duces tecum (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1985). 
With the thought in mind that section 1000 must be lib-
erally construed, I do not think the Legislature intended 
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to incorporate the aforementioned bill of discovery limitation. 
There is nothing in the language of the section which indi-
cates such a limitation. · Indeed it is to the contrary. It 
authorizes inspection by either party of any papers in the 
adversary's possession or control containing evidence relating 
to the "nwr#s" of the action or a "defense" therein. In 
speaking of the penalties suffered if the inspection is refused, 
the court may exclude the paper from being given in evidence, 
which could apply only to papers in support of the adver-
sary's own case. It then goes on to state the result where 
the paper of which inspection is refused is wanted by the 
applicant for his own case, thus further indicating that the 
inspectable papers are not confined to the applicant's own 
case. I agree with Professor Wigmore when he states in 
connection with a summary of the inspection statutes of the 
various states that "This legislation was plainly animated 
by a conviction that the existing principles were defective, 
and that, for the reasons already examined (ante, § 184 7), 
a determined inroad should be made on the sportsman's theory 
that the adversary is entitled to keep his own evidence to 
himself until the trial." (Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.), 
supra, § 1859.) It has been held in other states with statutes 
which do not contain the phrases last above discussed, having 
only the first sentence like section 1000, that pretrial inspec-
tion may be had of papers relevant for use by applicant 
even though they were the adversary's own documentary 
evidence. (See Looney v. Saltonstall, 212 Mass. 69 [98 N.E. 
698] ; Fox v. Derrickson, 7 Boyce (Del.Super.) 129 [104 A. 
155] ; Lacoss v. Town of Lebanon, 78 N.H. 413 [101 A. 364] ; 
see cases contra collected Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.), 
§ 1856b.) 
In this state, the cases have not indicated that the limitation 
in the bill of discovery existed under section 1000. Some 
cases speak of the statutory law as springing from the bill 
of discovery or as being based on that principle. (Wright 
v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. 469 [73 P. 145] ; Union Trust 
Co. v. Sttperior Court, S1tpra, 11 Cal.2d 449; Parker v. Shell 
Oil Co., 55 Cal.App.2d 48 [130 P.2d 158].) But none of 
them holds that the limitation here discussed is present. 
They do speak of the necessity of liberality in allowing in-
spection. Un,ion Collection Co. v. Sttperior Court, 149 Cal. 
790 [87 P. 1035], and Favorite v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 
App. 316 [198 P. 1004], merely hold that a person cannot 
by a bill of discovery obtain evidence on a collateral matter 
that is not relevant to any of the issues in the case. In 
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Reed v. Union Copper M·in. Co., 1 Cal.Unrep. 587, it was 
said that a bill of discovery was not proper because 
defendant could be required to answer under oath or called 
as a witness. .Ex par·te Clarke, 126 Cal. 235 [58 P. 546, 77 
Am.St.Rep. 176, 46 L.R.A. 835], holds only that books cannot 
be required to be produced unless shown to be material to 
some issue. People v. Nields, 70 Cal.App. 191 [232 P. 985], 
and Barrington v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 83 Cal.App. HJO 
[256 P. 567], dealt with a lack of showing of materiality. 
It has been said, without discussion of the point here involved, 
that inspection was proper although the documents bore evi-
dence of the adversary's own case. (Avery v. WiUsee, 177 
Cal. 484 [171 P. 95], defendant wanted plaintiff's books in 
action by plaintiff for attorney's fees and money expended 
by plaintiff for defendant.) In Demaree v. Superior Court, 
S1tpra, 10 Cal.2d 99, it was held that by subpoena duces 
tecum on deposition to perpetuate testimony (which of course 
was before trial), in a pending personal injury action against 
defendant, an alleged insured, plaintiff, could obtain the 
production of any insurance policy covering him because it 
could be material in an action against the insurer, if and 
when such action was brought, after and if he obtained 
judgment against defendant. To the same effect is Superior 
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 749 [235 P.2d 833]. 
I conclude, therefore, that the materiality of the papers 
included in the inspection order clearly appears and that 
they are such that they come under the provisions of section 
1000 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
I would therefore deny the writ as to all documents. 
The petition of real party in interest for a rehearing was 
denied April 7, 1954. Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. Carter, J., 
filed the following opinion : 
GARTER, J.-The petition for rehearing herein calls atten-
tion to the fact that the record does not disclose that the photo-
graphs in question were taken by an agent of the city. 
This is correct. The record does not disclose by whom the 
photographs were taken. It is alleged in the affidavits that 
the photographs were in the possession of counsel for the 
city but there is no showing whatsoever that the photographs 
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were taken by anyone on behalf of the city or that they were 
acquired by the city in contemplation of litigation arising 
out of the accident here involved. Since the burden was on 
the petitioner here to show that the photographs were privi-
leged, it is clear that he failed to make such showing. 'rhe 
majority opinion is therefore based upon the erroneous as-
sumption that the photographs were taken by an agent of 
the city. 
Since the decision in this case was filed my attention has 
been called to several authorities which support the ruling 
of the trial court here but which were not cited in any of 
the briefs. 'rhese authorities are Morehouse v. Morehouse, 
136 Cal. 332 [68 P. 976], !heel v. Market St. Cable Ry. Co., 
97 Cal. 40 [31 P. 730], Hirshfeld v. Dana, 193 Cal. 142 [223 
P. 451], Corcli v. Garcia, 39 Cal.App.2d 189 [102 P.2d 820]. 
None of these authorities is cited in either the majority or 
dissenting opinions and were not considered by the court in 
the decision of this case. 
In JllcKinley v. Sotdhern Pac. Co., 80 Cal.App.2d 301, 314 
[181 P.2d 899], the court said: "The next contention of 
appellants Southern Pacific Company and its employees is 
that the trial court erred in granting respondents' motion 
to compel said appellants to produce written reports of the 
accident made by appellants Ahlborn and Shafer (the engineer 
and fireman) to their superior. Upon cross-examination of 
said appellants respondents brought out the fact that they 
had made written reports to B. E. Stone, their superior, and 
counsel for respondents thereupon demanded said statements 
and moved the court for an order requiring appellants to 
produce them, which motion was granted by the court over 
the objection of said appellants. Appellants concede that 
no prejudice resulted to them from said ruling but urge that 
it is a question of some importance and should be determined 
by this court. . . . 
"In M orehmtse v. Morehouse, 136 Cal. 332, 337 [ 68 P. 
976], the court, qtwting from Ex parte Clarke, 126 Cal. 235, 
239 [58 P. 546, 77 Am.St.Rep. 176, 46 L.R.A. 835], said: 
' [\V] hen a witness is in court ... and discloses that he 
has a paper, document, or book which would be evidence in 
favor of the party desiring it, he may, in a proper case, be 
rightfully ordered to produce it.' See, also, Freel v. Market 
St. Cable Ry. Co., 97 Cal. 40, 44 [31 P. 730] ; Hirshfeld v. 
Dana, 193 Cal. 142, 153 [223 P. 451]; Cordi v. Garcia, 39 
Cal.App.2d 189, 196 [102 P.2d 820]. And in the latter case 
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the court, after citing Morehouse v. Morehouse, sttpra, said 
that the right of defendants' attorney to inspect and use 
letters in question for impeachment purposes might have 
been properly granted. 
''Appellants assert that no showing was made in this case 
that anything in the requested statements was material to 
the issues in the instant case, but it is difficult to understand 
how written reports by the engineer and the fireman to their 
superior as to the details of the accident could fail to be 
material. ·where the engineer and fireman were witnesses 
and testified as to such details, and in the course of such 
testimony stated that they had made such written reports, 
it was, in our opinion, clearly proper for the trial court to 
grant respondents' motion to order appellants to produce said 
statements for respondents' use in further cross-examination. 
If there were statements in said reports inconsistent with the 
testimony of the witnesses, respondents were entitled to use 
them for impeachment purposes, and if there were no incon-
sistent statements in said reports, no possible injury could 
result to appellants. A trial court must be depended upon 
to exercise a wise discretion in such matters to protect a party 
from any unnecessary disclosure to others of the contents 
of his private books, papers and records, but no party has a 
right to refuse to produce any report or document which 
may have a bearing upon the facts of the pending litigation.'' 
The decision in the McKinley case was rendered June 12th, 
1947, and a hearing was denied by this court on August 7th, 
1947. I respectfully submit that the majority holding in 
the case at bar is in direct conflict with all of the above cited 
authorities. 
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